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It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it 
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if 
it should. . . . We have no more right to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not 
given.  The one or the other would be treason to the 
constitution. 
—Chief Justice John Marshall, Cohens v. Virginia1 
 
These words reflect the Chief Justice’s belief that the United 
States Constitution requires the federal judiciary to hear all 
cases that are properly before it.  However, over the course of 
time, and given the increasing strain upon judicial resources, 
federal courts have developed and refined several means of 
deferring or declining their exercise of jurisdiction.  One such 
mechanism is abstention.  Abstention doctrines direct federal 
courts, under certain circumstances, to refrain from deciding 
cases within their jurisdiction, thus transferring part or all of 
their responsibility to a state court.2 
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court decided Colorado 
River Water Conservation District v. United States, holding that a 
federal court may defer a water rights adjudication, in certain 
instances, to a state court.3  The Court’s reasoning hinged on the 
convenience of ruling at the state level, avoidance of piecemeal 
litigation, and promotion of “wise judicial administration.”4  
Colorado River thereby established state courts as the principal 
for adjudicating all water rights, even federal reserved water 
rights, within state boundaries.5 
 
1 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). 
2 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 783–85 (5th ed. 2007). 
3 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813–15 
(1976). 
4 Id. at 818. 
5 Robert H. Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing 
Scope of Federal Jurisdiction: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 
1111 (1978). 
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Nearly thirty years ago, Professor Robert Abrams argued that 
Colorado River would have “harmful consequences for proper 
determination of [federal] reserved [water] rights claims” and 
would subsequently impede proper development of federal 
lands.6  Despite Professor Abrams’ concern, Colorado River has 
not foreclosed federal jurisdiction over all water rights conflicts. 
Some federal courts have since exercised jurisdiction over water 
rights adjudications by distinguishing Colorado River on both 
the facts and law.7 
Within the context of water rights issues, this Note discusses 
how federal courts have analyzed Colorado River in deciding 
whether to exercise jurisdiction or abstain because of 
“exceptional circumstances.”8  Part I provides a brief overview of 
judicially created abstention doctrines.  Part II discusses the 
tension among federal reserved water rights, the prior 
appropriation doctrine, and a state’s authority over allocating its 
own water.  Part II also focuses on the reasons federal agencies 
may choose to assert water rights claims in federal court and 
how the McCarran Amendment has limited that choice. 
Part III describes the Colorado River decision in detail and 
analyzes how courts have applied and misapplied its doctrine 
when resolving water rights issues.  Part IV examines the 
doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction, a narrow abstention 
exception focusing on situations where the court that originally 
adjudicated a water-rights determination, whether state or 
federal, would have exclusive jurisdiction over all subsequent 
adjudications concerning the same water body.  Part V explains 
how Colorado River abstention and the prior exclusive 
jurisdiction doctrine connect in the realm of water rights 
 
6 Id. 
7 See, e.g., United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 705–07 (9th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d 1007, 1009, 1012–14 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
8 As noted in Colorado River, federal courts should abstain only in “exceptional 
circumstances.”  424 U.S. at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda 
Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188–89 (1959)).  The following factors are considered to 
determine whether exceptional circumstances exist: avoiding piecemeal litigation; 
whether congressionally declared policy exists that would be supported by 
abstention; the order in which jurisdiction was obtained; the relative progress of 
state and federal court proceedings; the source of governing law, state or federal; 
and the adequacy of state court action in protecting federal rights.  Id. 
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conflicts.  The Note concludes by providing a final assessment of 
the subject at hand. 
I 
JUDICIALLY CREATED ABSTENTION DOCTRINES 
Abstention doctrines are judicially created common law rules 
that enable federal courts to decide not to rule on matters before 
them “even though all jurisdictional and justiciability 
requirements are met.”9  Proponents of these doctrines believe 
abstention is necessary to serve vital interests, such as protecting 
states within a system of federalism.10  Critics condemn 
abstention as an unjustified violation of separation of powers.11  
The Supreme Court endorses abstention, but only under certain 
circumstances.12 
For instance, abstention is sometimes appropriate to allow 
state courts to clarify ambiguous state law.  Three significant 
Supreme Court cases explain when abstention due to unclear 
state law is warranted.  Railroad Commission of Texas v. 
Pullman Co. determined that federal court abstention is 
necessary when a state court’s clarification of state law might 
make a federal court’s constitutional ruling unnecessary.13  The 
Court offered three reasons for this holding: friction would be 
avoided between federal and state courts, the likelihood of 
erroneous interpretations would be reduced, and the need for 
federal constitutional rulings would be obviated.14  In Louisiana 
 
9 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 783. 
10 Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. 
REV. 1097, 1108, 1117–18 (1985). 
11 Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the 
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (1984). 
12 It is uncertain within the Court whether abstention is mandatory or 
discretionary.  There have been times when the Court has ruled that it must abstain 
if a state’s clarification might avoid a constitutional ruling.  See, e.g., City of 
Meridian v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639, 640–41 (1959).  However, there 
have been other times when the Court has treated abstention as a discretionary 
tool.  See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); NAACP v. Bennett, 360 
U.S. 471, 471 (1959).  More recently, the Court has stated that abstention was 
historically derived from the discretion inherent in all courts of equity.  
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 727–28 (1996). 
13 R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
14 Id. at 499–501.  These reasons, however, have been criticized by many 
commentators.  See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The 
Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1090 (1974)  
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Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, the Court established 
that federal courts should abstain in diversity cases if state law is 
unclear and a pertinent state interest is tightly linked with the 
government’s “sovereign prerogative.”15  In Burford v. Sun Oil 
Co., the Court justified abstention because of the presence of 
both unclear questions of state law and the need to defer to 
complex state administrative proceedings.16  Although the 
Pullman and Thibodaux doctrines allow a case to return to 
federal court if necessary once state law is clarified, Burford 
abstention requires the court to dismiss the case rather than stay 
the proceedings.17  Furthermore, the procedures vary in a 
number of other respects depending on what type of abstention 
is involved.18 
Federal courts also abstain in certain circumstances to avoid 
interference with pending state proceedings.  The Court in 
Younger v. Harris held that federal courts may not enjoin 
pending state court criminal proceedings.19  This doctrine 
extends to prevent federal courts from interfering with: (1) state 
civil proceedings, both involving the government as a party and 
between private litigants;20 (2) state administrative proceedings 
 
(challenging whether Pullman abstention doctrine actually lessens friction between 
federal and state courts and arguing that it is questionable that federal judges are 
less capable of correctly interpreting state law than are state judges); Lisa A. 
Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994) 
(criticizing the principle that federal courts should avoid constitutional rulings). 
15 La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28–30 (1959); see 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 800.  The Court in Quackenbush seemed to expand 
the scope of abstention in diversity cases by allowing federal courts to abstain so 
long as the case was stayed and not dismissed, even if there was not some special 
state interest as required by Thibodaux.  Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721.  Many 
commentators are also critical of the Thibodaux abstention doctrine.  See Charles L. 
Gowen & William H. Izlar, Federal Court Abstention in Diversity of Citizenship 
Litigation, 43 TEX. L. REV. 194, 194 (1964) (arguing that abstention defeats the very 
purpose of diversity jurisdiction–providing a neutral federal forum for litigants 
from different states); Kelly D. Hickman, Note, Federal Court Abstention in 
Diversity of Citizenship Cases, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237, 1256–62 (1989) (arguing 
that the application of Thibodaux should be limited to only certain occasions). 
16 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332–34 (1943). 
17 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 803. 
18 Id. at 808–17. 
19 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971). 
20 See, e.g., New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 
350, 367–68 (1989). 
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involving important state interests;21 (3) actions requesting 
injunctive relief against state and local executive officers;22 and 
(4) the review of the legality of military tribunals.23  As with the 
other abstention doctrines, scholars disagree over the desirability 
of the Younger doctrine.24 
Whether a federal court should exercise its jurisdiction or 
defer to a state court is a subject of great debate.  After all, the 
first court to rule might preclude the other from deciding the 
case because of res judicata.25  Some commentators argue that 
federal courts should not be required to abstain when there are 
duplicative proceedings.  Mandatory abstention under these 
circumstances “would give federal court defendants a powerful 
tool for defeating federal jurisdiction” by filing in state court.26  
In 1942, in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, the 
Court held that federal court deference to a pending state 
proceeding is appropriate if the federal court is convinced that 
the state court would adequately settle the controversy.27  The 
Court found that it would not make economic sense for a federal 
court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another 
 
21 See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 
619, 627–28 & n.2 (1986). 
22 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976). 
23 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2769–72 (2006); Schlesinger v. 
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 740, 758 (1975). 
24 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 820 n.4; see also supra notes 14–15. 
25 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 865.  See generally James C. Rehnquist, 
Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 1049 (1994) (arguing that federal court abstention is only justified when a 
duplicative suit is first filed in state court and provides a litigant with an adequate 
opportunity to raise his or her federal claim); David J. McCarthy, Note, Preclusion 
Concerns as an Additional Factor When Staying a Federal Suit in Deference to a 
Concurrent State Proceeding, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183 (1985) (recommending 
that res judicata principles be considered when federal courts are determining to 
stay their proceedings due to pending state court litigation). 
26 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 868.  The U.S. Supreme Court has long 
established that “the pendency of a prior suit in another jurisdiction is not a bar to a 
subsequent suit . . . even though the two suits are for the same cause of action.”  
Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 554 (1876).  In addition, there has been no 
indication by Congress, based on their jurisdictional statutes, that it wants federal 
courts to abstain when there are federal proceedings.  See Martin H. Redish, 
Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance 
Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 
1354–55 (2000). 
27 Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942). 
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suit was pending in state court with state law issues arising 
between the same parties.28 
A detailed examination of the abstention doctrines is beyond 
the scope of this Note.29  The examples above are merely 
intended to set forth the range of options that a federal court 
may have when a water rights claim filed in its jurisdiction 
duplicates litigation simultaneously occurring in state court. 
II 
BALANCING FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS AND STATE 
WATER RIGHTS 
A.  Whose Right to What Water Under Which Sovereign’s 
Court of Law 
Unless state law interferes with congressional directives, each 
state in the United States has the authority to determine how 
water will be allocated and administered among its citizens.30  In 
most western states, water rights are allocated pursuant to the 
doctrine of prior appropriation.31  This doctrine allows the first 
user, established by priority dates, to retain a right to water if it 
is used for a specific “beneficial use.”32  These beneficial uses are 
determined and defined by state law.33  
 
28 Id.  Brillhart was reaffirmed in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 
(1995), which held that federal courts have discretion to abstain in declaratory 
judgment suits pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006). 
29 For a sampling of the vast amount of literature on abstention doctrines, 
commentaries on how each doctrine affects the relationship between federal and 
state courts, and subsequent case law that has more clearly defined how these 
doctrines should be applied, see Leonard Birdsong, Comity and Our Federalism in 
the Twenty-First Century: The Abstention Doctrines Will Always Be with Us–Get 
Over It!!, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 375 (2003) (providing an overview of the classic 
abstention doctrines, criticisms of these doctrines, and how they have been applied 
in the twenty-first century); Mathew D. Staver, The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing 
Comity with Federal Court Intervention, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1102 (1998) 
(discussing the different abstention doctrines). 
30 Adell Louise Amos, The Use of State Instream Flow Laws for Federal Lands: 
Respecting State Control While Meeting Federal Purposes, 36 ENVTL. L. 1237, 1241–
42 (2006); see also Todd A. Fisher, Note, The Winters of Our Discontent: Federal 
Reserved Water Rights in the Western States, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1093 (1984). 
31 Amos, supra note 30, at 1242 & n.16. 
32 Id. at 1242; see also Jennie L. Bricker & David E. Filippi, Endangered Species 
Act Enforcement and Western Water Law, 30 ENVTL. L. 735, 739–40 (2000). 
33 Amos, supra note 30, at 1242. 
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When the federal government reserves or acquires land for 
some particular purpose, a certain amount of unappropriated 
water necessary to achieve the purposes of the federal land 
designation is implicitly reserved.34  This authority is defined as 
federal reserved water rights.35  Federal agencies may assert 
federal reserved water rights, for example, in the following 
circumstances: (1) fulfilling the purposes of an Indian 
reservation, usually for agriculture; and (2) fulfilling purposes of 
federal land in general, such as recreation, fish and wildlife, wild 
and scenic rivers, and national parks.36 
Federal reserved water rights are not created or maintained 
based upon any beneficial use; thus, the right may remain 
“dormant” until the water is needed.37  In contrast, holders of 
appropriative rights, pursuant to state law, must continue the 
beneficial use or must relinquish that particular water right.38  
Federal agencies often assert ownership rights to water within 
state boundaries to fulfill federal purposes, providing subsequent 
protection to proprietary interests.39  When there is not enough 
water to meet the needs of water rights holders, federal reserved 
water rights usually trump prior appropriation rights acquired 
under state law.40  As a result, state and federal sovereigns often 
argue over the allocation of water resources.41  This Note 
 
34 Id. at 1243–44 & n.21; see Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). 
35 Sean E. O’Day, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court: Rejecting 
Legislative Favoritism in Water Right Allocations, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 29, 
37 (2000). 
36 See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., State Water Politics Versus an Independent Judiciary: 
The Colorado and Idaho Experiences, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 122, 129–30 
(2001). 
37 See Fisher, supra note 30, at 1090. 
38 Id. 
39 Amos, supra note 30, at 1243. 
40 See, e.g., Bricker & Filippi, supra note 32, at 750–54 (finding that state-
certificated water rights may be reduced or eliminated by federal law pursuant to 
the Endangered Species Act’s section 9 takings provision); see also Abrams, supra 
note 5, at 1113–14.  However, this depends on how expansive or narrow a court 
construes the federal reserved water right.  For instance, a state court may narrowly 
construe a federal reserved water right because the proposed water use is not for a 
primary purpose of an Indian reservation.  See Fisher, supra note 30, at 1089–93 
(providing an analysis of how the prior appropriation doctrine can be reconciled 
with the Winters doctrine). 
41 Amos, supra note 30, at 1243 (citing John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western 
Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.  
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explores the resolution to such water rights disputes that arise 
when federal and state interests clash in the western United 
States, where natural supply of water is commonly outpaced by 
human demand. 
States claim that federal agencies should use state law 
mechanisms to secure their water rights.42  Federal 
administrators, however, may additionally assert water rights 
under the federal reserved water rights doctrine.43  The Supreme 
Court has upheld the federal reserved water rights doctrine, but 
only for securing water rights for the “primary purposes” of the 
reservation or land designation.44  The Court has indicated that 
when water rights are necessary for secondary purposes, federal 
agencies should secure these rights under state law.45  However, 
federal agencies appear to have some flexibility in determining 
whether to invoke federal mechanisms to protect water for 
federal lands or reconcile their individual federal mandates with 
state water code provisions by relying on state law.  In addition, 
federal policies acknowledge circumstances where state law may 
be insufficient to protect federal purposes.46  In these instances, 
federal agencies may turn to the federal reserved water rights 
doctrine and federal courts to lay claim to federal reserved water 
rights. 
A federal agency may often prefer to assert a federal reserved 
water right as opposed to a state-based instream flow right 
because of established priority dates.47  As mentioned before, 
 
355 (2005)).  There has also been great tension between state and federal courts 
related to jurisdiction over tribal reserved water rights claims.  See Harold S. 
Shepherd, State Court Jurisdiction over Tribal Water Rights: A Call for Rational 
Thinking, 17 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 343, 344–45 (2002).  See generally Reed D. 
Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority Under 
Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241 (2006). 
42 Amos, supra note 30, at 1243 (citing John D. Leshy, Water Rights for New 
Federal Land Conservation Programs: A Turn-of-the-Century Evaluation, 4 U. 
DENV. WATER L. REV. 271, 283 (2001)). 
43 Amos, supra note 30, at 1242–44. 
44 Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976). 
45 United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700–02 (1978). 
46 A federal agency looks to its enabling legislation and internal policies to 
determine the purposes that must be met.  Amos, supra note 30, at 1246.  Professor 
Amos describes how some agencies are more flexible, based on their policies and 
mandates, in working with state administrators to protect their particular resources.  
Id. at 1244–49; see also Bricker & Filippi, supra note 32, at 757–59. 
47 Amos, supra note 30, at 1262. 
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under the prior appropriation system, the first water user to 
perform a beneficial use has a full right to the water in its 
entirety.48  State water codes, for the most part, have only 
recently defined an instream flow right as a true water right.49  
Given these instream rights’ new status, they are placed later in 
the priority date system.50  Since the amount of available 
unappropriated water in the West is severely limited, a federal 
land manager is more likely to pursue a federal reserved water 
right.51  An earlier priority date secures a more consistent 
availability of water for federal lands.52 
Federal land managers may also prefer to assert water rights 
under federal law to meet the water needs of a particular 
reservation due to limitations or risks of state law.  These 
limitations or risks include: (1) subjective definitions of 
beneficial use; (2) structural issues, such as mechanisms for 
holding instream flow rights or determining priority dates for 
such rights, that may prevent the federal government from 
securing necessary water rights; (3) states lacking the 
administrative ability to process an application to secure federal 
reserved rights; and (4) state “political and institutional 
obstacles” hindering “full utilization of state law by federal 
agencies,” thus creating complications for those agencies seeking 
water rights for the purposes of their land designations.53 
Although states may control the allocation of water within 
their boundaries, the large quantity of federal land and federal 
agency policies may overwhelm state water allocation systems,54 
thereby persuading federal land managers to assert water rights 
in federal court.  In addition to all of the reasons stated above, 
federal land managers would also prefer to assert water rights in 
federal court because, in general, state water courts are often 
less protective of federal water rights than are federal courts.55 
 
48 See supra note 32. 
49 See Amos, supra note 30, at 1262. 
50 Id. at 1262–63. 
51 Id. at 1263. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1249. 
54 Id. at 1249–50. 
55 Abrams, supra note 5, at 1113–14.  Federal courts are more likely to be 
familiar with federal water law and Indian treaties than state courts and thus rule in 
favor of federal interests in accordance with such applicable legal provisions.  Id. at  
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B.  The McCarran Amendment’s Limitation on Federal   
Decision Makers 
The passing of the McCarran Amendment (the Amendment) 
in 1952 limited the choice of federal land managers to assert 
water rights under federal law in federal court.56  The 
Amendment waives the sovereign immunity of the United States 
in suits involving the adjudication and administration of water 
rights.57  The development of the Amendment stemmed from 
western states’ distrust in the federal government in matters 
involving water rights.58  Furthermore, the legislative history of 
the Amendment reveals that Congress sought to protect the 
doctrine of prior appropriation and state authority in water 
rights matters.59  Members of Congress from the various western 
states were “offended that the United States could ignore state 
law and process,”60 while opponents of the bill feared that such 
proceedings would “encompass all federal water rights,” 
consequently limiting their own needs.61 
The United States Supreme Court first examined the 
Amendment in Dugan v. Rank in 1963.62  The Court noted that 
 
1130–31.  In addition, state courts may be pressured to find in favor of state 
interests and against the federal government’s reserved water rights claims because 
the supply of water in the West each year is commonly outpaced by the demand.  
Id. at 1131–32.  As such, state courts may narrowly construe federal reserved water 
rights to maximize important state interests.  Id. 
56 See Department of Justice Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 495, 66 Stat. 560 
(1952) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2006)). 
57 The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, provides: 
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit 
(1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other 
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the 
United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by 
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and 
the United States is a necessary party to such suit. 
58 Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis, Revisiting Colorado River Water 
Conservation District v. United States–There Must Be a Better Way, 27 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 597, 601 (1995). 
59 Id. at 601–02. 
60 Id. at 603. 
61 Id. at 604. 
62 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).  In Dugan, California irrigators sued to 
enjoin the United States from storing and diverting water at the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s Friant Dam, arguing that these operations would interfere with the 
plaintiff’s existing water rights downstream on the San Joaquin River.  Id. at 610, 
614–15. 
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even though the Amendment authorized state adjudications, the 
state proceeding must be a comprehensive stream adjudication.63  
In its 1971 decision in United States v. District Court in and for 
the County of Eagle, the Court held that the United States could 
be joined as a party defendant in state water adjudications over 
federal reserved water rights.64  Justice Douglas stated that the 
McCarran Amendment’s waiver of sovereign immunity applied 
to federal reserved water rights as well as non-reserved rights.65  
The Court again addressed the application of the Amendment 
and the question of jurisdiction over reserved rights in Colorado 
River Water Conservation District v. United States.66 
III 
COLORADO RIVER ABSTENTION 
A.  Colorado River Overview 
The Colorado River Court examined the McCarran 
Amendment’s effect on federal district jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1345.67  The specific issue involved water rights suits 
brought by the United States as trustee for certain Indian tribes 
and as owner of various non-Indian government claims.68  The 
 
63 Id. at 618–19. 
64 United States v. Dist. Court in & for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 523–24 
(1971) (noting that the McCarran Amendment’s reference to the federal 
government’s “rights to the use of water of a river system” is broad enough to cover 
federal reserved rights, including those rights extending to Indian rights). 
65 Id. at 524.  However, the Court has also stated that “if there [was] a collision 
between prior adjudicated rights and reserved rights of the United States, the 
federal question can be preserved in the state decision and brought here for 
review.”  United States v. Dist. Court in & for Water Div. No. 05, 401 U.S. 527, 529–
30 (1971). 
66 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 802–03 
(1976). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 803.  The Court first provided an overview of legal procedures in 
Colorado for allocating water and adjudicating conflicting claims for water.  Id. at 
804–05.  Under Colorado’s Water Rights Determination and Administration Act, 
enacted in 1969, Colorado is divided into seven water divisions where water claims 
are adjudicated on a continuous basis within each division. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 
37-92-101 to -602 (2007).  A water referee in each division either rules on a water 
rights application or refers it to a water judge.  Id. § 37-92-603.  Colorado, like most 
western states, applies the doctrine of prior appropriation through which one 
acquires a priority among confirmed rights based on the date he or she began to use  
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United States, claiming federal reserved water rights for those 
waters affecting Colorado Water Division No. 7, initiated a suit 
in federal district court in Colorado seeking a declaration of 
those rights on its own behalf and on behalf of certain Indian 
tribes.69  Private irrigators, named as defendants, claimed rights 
to the same water.70  A number of Colorado water conservation 
districts subsequently intervened as defendants.71  Shortly 
thereafter, one defendant filed suit in Colorado state court 
seeking adjudication of the same rights.72  The United States was 
joined as a defendant pursuant to the Amendment.73  
Subsequently, several defendants and intervenors sought to 
dismiss the federal case by arguing that the Amendment vested 
the state courts with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the 
reserved rights of the United States.74 
On June 21, 1973, the district court granted the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, without deciding the jurisdictional question, 
pursuant to the abstention doctrine.75  Thereafter, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that abstention 
was inappropriate and that the district court had jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1345.76  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to determine whether the McCarran Amendment foreclosed 
federal district courts from adjudicating federal water rights, and 
if not, whether the district court dismissed the case 
appropriately.77 
The Court first considered whether the district court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345.78  Based on this statute’s 
 
water by diverting it from a natural source and applying it to some beneficial use.  
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 805. 
69 Id. 
70 See id. at 805–06. 
71 See id. 






78 Id. at 806–09.  28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2006) provides: “Except as otherwise provided 
by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or 
officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress.” (emphasis added).  
The Court examined whether the McCarran Amendment constituted an Act of  
 
254 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 23, 241 
language and legislative history, the Court determined that the 
Amendment did not repeal district court jurisdiction under § 
1345 to adjudicate suits brought by the United States for 
adjudication of claimed federal water rights.79  As a result, the 
Court concluded that the Amendment gave consent to 
jurisdiction in both state and federal courts over controversies 
involving federal rights to the use of water.80 
The Court then discussed whether it was appropriate for the 
federal district court to dismiss the case in view of concurrent 
proceedings in Colorado state court.81  The Court found that 
none of the existing judicially created abstention doctrines were 
appropriate to dismiss the case.82  However, certain 
circumstances would permit federal courts to dismiss a case 
similar to this one “due to the presence of a concurrent state 
proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration.”83  The 
Court noted that these circumstances are “considerably more 
limited than the circumstances appropriate for abstention.”84 
The Court identified four factors that a federal court should 
consider in assessing the appropriateness of dismissal when 
concurrent jurisdiction is being exercised: (1) the problems that 
might occur when a state and federal court assume jurisdiction 
over the same real property;85 (2) the federal forum’s relative 
inconvenience; (3) the avoidance of piecemeal litigation; and (4) 
the order in which concurrent forums obtained jurisdiction.86  
Federal courts must take into account these factors as well as 
their “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the 
jurisdiction given them” when determining dismissal of a case 
 
Congress that excepted jurisdiction under § 1345.  Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 806–
09. 
79 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 807. 
80 Id. at 809. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 813–17 & n.23.  The Pullman, Burford, and Younger abstention doctrines 
are more aimed at federalism concerns–preventing federal courts from interfering 
in matters better left to state administration–while Colorado River abstention is 
more concerned with conservation of judicial resources.  Bricker & Filippi, supra 
note 32, at 752–53. 
83 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818. 
84 Id. 
85 See infra Part IV. 
86 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818. 
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when there exists a pending state court proceeding.87  A federal 
court may avoid this obligation “only in the exceptional 
circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the 
state court would clearly serve an important countervailing 
interest.”88 
The Court relied heavily on its interpretation of the 
Amendment and its underlying policy, which was to avoid 
“piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system.”89  
Furthermore, Justice Brennan viewed the Amendment as “a 
policy that recognizes the availability of comprehensive state 
systems for adjudication of water rights as the means for 
achieving these goals.”90  In addition, the Court found significant: 
(a) the apparent absence of any proceedings in the District 
Court, other than the filing of the complaint, prior to the 
motion to dismiss, (b) the extensive involvement of state water 
rights occasioned by this suit naming 1,000 defendants, (c) the 
300-mile distance between the District Court in Denver and 
the court in Division 7, and (d) the existing participation by the 
Government in Division 4, 5, and 6 proceedings.91 
The Colorado River doctrine thus created the presumption that 
a federal action should be dismissed when both federal and state 
actions are pending for purposes of adjudicating federal reserved 
water rights.92 
Although Colorado River seemingly clarified the law with 
regard to abstention in the case of parallel proceedings, 
“confusion [remained] among the lower courts as to what 
constituted sufficiently exceptional circumstances as to justify 
deference to concurrent state court litigation.”93 
 
87 Id. at 817. 
88 Id. at 813 (emphasis added) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda 
Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188–89 (1959)). 
89 Id. at 819. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 820 (citation omitted). 
92 Fisher, supra note 30, at 1084.  For additional commentary on Colorado River, 
see David A. Sonenshein, Abstention: The Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 
TUL. L. REV. 651 (1985); Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the 
Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99 (1986). 
93 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 874.  Professor Sonenshein observed that 
some lower federal courts “resisted deference in the absence of ‘exceptional 
circumstances,’ while others indicated that Colorado River might have freed them  
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B.  Subsequent Applications of Colorado River Abstention94 
1.  Adair v. United States Cases 
In 1975, the United States brought suit in the District Court of 
Oregon seeking a declaration of water rights in the Williamson 
River drainage.95  Four months after the United States filed suit, 
the State of Oregon initiated formal proceedings to adjudicate 
all water rights in the Klamath Basin, which included the 
Williamson River drainage.96  Oregon and the Klamath Tribe 
both intervened in the federal suit.97  Oregon moved to dismiss 
the case on jurisdictional grounds pursuant to the rule 
announced in Colorado River.98 
As noted in Adair II, the district court denied the motion and, 
in lieu of abstaining, limited its ruling to issues of federal law.99  
Specifically, the court retained its jurisdiction to determine the 
existence, scope, and priority of water rights among the litigants.  
These determinations included the Klamath Tribe’s hunting, 
fishing, and irrigation rights; the federal government’s water 
rights in the Winema National Forest; and non-Indian 
landowners’ and the State’s rights to water for irrigation and 
domestic uses.100  In its unpublished declaratory judgment, the 
Adair I court decided to retain its jurisdiction 
for the purpose of enabling the parties . . . to apply to this court 
at any time for such orders and directions as may be necessary 
 
to clear their dockets merely because a parallel, and thus duplicative, state court 
action had been filed.”  Sonenshein, supra note 92, at 667. 
94 “Although commonly referred to as an abstention doctrine, the Supreme 
Court has flatly rejected this categorization.” Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 
1415 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4247, at 150–51 (2d ed. 1988)). 
95 United States v. Adair (Adair I), 478 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D. Or. 1979) aff'd, 723 
F.2d 1394, 1419–20 (9th Cir. 1983). 
96 United States v. Adair (Adair II), 723 F.2d 1394, 1398–99 (9th Cir. 1983). 
97 Id. at 1399. 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  It should be noted that the district court never expressly ruled on the 
motion to dismiss under the Colorado River doctrine.  Id.  However, during the 
hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the court and counsel discussed 
Colorado River and its application to the facts of this particular case which led to 
the court’s pretrial order of how the federal suit would proceed and be governed.  
Id. at 1402 n.6. 
100 Adair I, 478 F. Supp. at 350; Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1399. 
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or appropriate for the construction and effectuation of this 
judgment, for the modification of any of the provisions hereof, 
and for the enforcement of compliance with this judgment.101 
The court, however, left the quantification of those rights to the 
State of Oregon’s Klamath Basin Adjudication.102  Thereafter, 
the State and individual defendants appealed the decision, 
arguing that the district court should have dismissed the case 
under the Colorado River doctrine.103 
The Ninth Circuit’s Adair II decision concluded that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining federal 
law priorities among water rights for each party.104  The court 
noted that there are circumstances where a federal water suit 
need not be dismissed or stayed in deference to a concurrent and 
adequate state adjudication.105  Specifically, the court cited to the 
posture of the case,106 the limited nature of the district court’s 
decision on federal law questions,107 and the overriding objective 
of the Colorado River abstention doctrine in avoiding 
duplication and waste of state and federal judicial resources.108  
The court mainly proceeded on the premise that “the federal suit 
 
101 See United States v. Adair (Adair III), 187 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1274 (D. Or. 
2002), vacated on other grounds, United States v. Braren (Adair IV), 338 F.3d 971, 
974–76 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the dispute in Adair III was not ripe for federal 
judicial determination). 
102 Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1399. 
103 Id. at 1399–1400.  The United States and the tribes initially tried to avoid the 
abstention doctrine entirely by arguing that the McCarran Amendment did not 
apply because the Oregon adjudication was an administrative proceeding and not a 
“suit” within the meaning of the Amendment.  Id. at 1405 n.9.  The Ninth Circuit, 
however, rejected that argument stating that “the Supreme Court has warned 
against [an] overly technical application of the McCarran Amendment.”  Id. (citing 
United States v. Dist. Court in & for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 525 (1971)). 
104 Id. at 1403–04. 
105 Id. at 1404–05 & n.8. 
106 At the time of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, nearly seven years after the initial 
notice of investigation, the state’s determination of water rights in the Klamath 
Basin still had not proceeded beyond the administrative phase; in effect, this was a 
stayed state proceeding.  Id. at 1405. 
107 The district court only ruled on those questions involving the application of 
the Federal Indian law doctrine of reserved water rights, thereby avoiding state law 
matters and allowing each forum to consider those issues most within their own 
expertise.  Id. at 1406. 
108 Id. at 1404; see Ryan Sudbury, Case Note, When Good Streams Go Dry: 
United States v. Adair and the Unprincipled Elimination of a Federal Forum for 
Treaty Reserved Rights, 25 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 147, 158–61 (2004). 
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at issue [may be] well enough along that its dismissal would itself 
constitute a waste of judicial resources and an invitation to 
duplicative effort.”109 
Given that the district court had taken evidence, developed a 
multi-volume record, and allowed for all parties to fully present 
their case, the Ninth Circuit determined that reversing and 
vacating the district court’s judgment was not in the best interest 
of “wise judicial administration.”110  Moreover, the district 
court’s decision to prioritize water rights under federal law did 
not add an otherwise unnecessary judicial step for establishing 
water rights in the Klamath Basin.111  In summary, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the district court properly limited its 
jurisdiction to a determination of federal water right priority 
dates, did not undertake a comprehensive stream adjudication, 
avoided any duplication of litigation, and did not cause a 
piecemeal determination of water rights.112 
2.  Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe 
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court heard Arizona v. 
San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona.113  The first question before 
the Court involved state jurisdiction over the adjudication of 
Indian water rights.114  A determination that states did have such 
jurisdiction would require the Court to then decide whether 
concurrent federal suits brought by Indian tribes, rather than the 
United States, should be dismissed pursuant to the Colorado 
 
109 Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1404 (quoting Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of 
Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 569 (1983)). 
110 Id. at 1405–06. 
111 Id. at 1406 n.11. 
112 Id. at 1407.  Thereafter, the district court exercised its jurisdiction “to 
determine two narrow issues: (1) whether the Klamath Tribes [had] a water right to 
support reserved gathering rights; and (2) whether and to what extent the 
‘moderate living’ standard applie[d] in quantifying the Tribes’ water rights.”  United 
States v. Adair, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1275 (D. Or. 2002) (Adair III), vacated on 
other grounds, United States v. Braren (Adair IV), 338 F.3d 971, 974–76 (9th Cir. 
2003).  The district court’s decision to proceed with analyzing the merits of the 
initial declaratory judgment as well as its announcement of a two-step method of 
establishing the tribes’ water rights was later vacated and remanded by the Ninth 
Circuit because the dispute was considered not ripe for judicial review.  Adair IV, 
338 F.3d at 974–76.  The Ninth Circuit, however, did not explore the challenges to 
the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction.  Id. at 976. 
113 San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545. 
114 Id. at 549. 
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River doctrine.115  The Court considered two petitions from tribes 
in Arizona and Montana arising out of three separate 
consolidated appeals with the United States, as trustee, and 
certain tribes on their own behalf asserting the right to have 
Indian water rights be adjudicated in federal court.116 
The Court first concluded that each state’s statehood enabling 
acts did not have any effect on the ability of state courts to 
adjudicate Indian water rights based on the McCarran 
Amendment.117  The Amendment’s intent to resolve the general 
problem of states not being able to adjudicate federal reserved 
water rights, the absence of textual language or legislative 
history showing that the Amendment should apply differently 
from one state to another, and the “ubiquitous nature of Indian 
water rights in the Southwest” all pointed to Arizona and 
Montana having state jurisdiction over Indian water rights.118 
The Court then analyzed whether Colorado River applied to 
federal water rights suits brought by Indian tribes, rather than 
the United States.119  The federal government and various Indian 
respondents argued that these federal suits should not be 
dismissed for a number of reasons: 
(1) Indian rights have traditionally been left free of 
interference from the States. (2) State courts may be 
inhospitable to Indian rights. (3) The McCarran Amendment   
. . . did not waive Indian sovereign immunity. . . . (4) Indian 
water rights claims are generally based on federal rather than 
state law. (5) Because Indian water claims are based on the 
doctrine of “reserved rights,” and take priority over most 
water rights created by statelaw, they . . . could simply be 
 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 553.  Starting in 1966, Indians were given the right to proceed in federal 
court, without having to meet the $10,000 amount-in-controversy then required 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question jurisdictional statute, when 28 
U.S.C. § 1362 was passed.  Id. at 561 n.10.  Section 1362 provides in relevant part: 
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by 
any Indian tribe . . . wherein the matter in controversy arises under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006). 
117 San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 563–64. 
118 Id. at 564–65 (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800, 811 (1976)).  The Court noted that any other result would defeat the 
purpose of the Amendment and constrain the rationale behind the Court’s ruling in 
Colorado River.  Id. at 464. 
119 Id. at 565. 
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incorporated into the comprehensive state decree at the 
conclusion of the state proceedings.120 
Justice Brennan agreed that these arguments were valid, but 
they were similarly raised and rejected in Colorado River and 
Eagle County.121  Again, the Court relied on the underlying 
policies of the McCarran Amendment.  These policies favored 
avoiding duplicative and wasteful proceedings, discouraging 
parties from racing to a forum that would best serve their 
interests, and encouraging state courts to adjudicate water rights 
in the course of comprehensive water rights adjudications.122  The 
Court dismissed the tribes’ argument that a state court could 
simply divert its attention away from the general, comprehensive 
adjudication until the federal court determined its quantification 
of Indian water rights.123  The Court refuted the respondents’ 
assumptions that federal courts could resolve these claims in a 
timely manner and that state courts, state legislatures, and state 
parties would fully cooperate with each other as being neither 
legally required nor realistically expected.124 
The Court concluded that the federal district court correctly 
deferred to the state court pursuant to policies underlying the 
McCarran Amendment, the state court’s expertise and efficiency 
in administering water rights adjudications, the nascent level of 
the federal litigation, and the convenience to the parties.125  
Federal courts in several more recent cases have either 
misapplied the Colorado River abstention doctrine or ruled that 
it is inapplicable.126 
 
120 Id. at 566–67. 
121 Id. at 567. 
122 Id. at 567–68.  However, state courts may not “adjudicate, administer, and 
regulate the appropriation and use of naturally-flowing water sources in a way 
which produces invidious discrimination” against Indian tribes.  K. Heidi Gudgell et 
al., The Nez Perce Tribe’s Perspective on the Settlement of its Water Right Claims in 
the Snake River Basin Adjudication, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 563, 570 (2006). 
123 Id. at 568–69. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 569–70. 
126 See, e.g., United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 697, 706–07 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that Colorado River abstention did not apply because the Department of 
Energy’s filing of water permit applications with Nevada’s state engineer for 
purposes of preparing Yucca Mountain as a national site for a nuclear waste 
repository were not considered a comprehensive stream adjudication, allocation of 
limited water rights was not a concern, nor were there any laws passed by Congress  
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IV 
PRIOR EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION DOCTRINE 
The general rule is that the existence of a case in one court 
does not preclude another court from hearing the same or 
similar case for the same cause of action.127  However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has established an exception for actions 
concerning real property.  The first court to rule in suits related 
to real property is entitled to exclusive jurisdiction over the 
matter.128  Furthermore, a state or federal court may enjoin any 
other court from hearing the case.129  This exception is designed 
to avoid inconsistent dispositions of property.  As the Colorado 
River Court mentioned, though, the real benefit of creating 
exclusive jurisdiction in such cases is to increase judicial 
efficiency by having a single court resolve the issue.130  Lower 
federal courts have identified several elements that must be 
present before they may divest jurisdiction and defer to state 
court proceedings.  These elements include: (1) the state court 
action must have been filed before the federal court action; (2) 
both actions, in federal and state court, must be in rem or quasi 
in rem, and not in personam; and (3) the state court must be able 
 
expressing a preference for state adjudication of federal preemption issues); United 
States v. City of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2002) (remanding the 
district court’s judgment because it did not provide suitable reasons to explain why 
they dismissed the case, pursuant to Colorado River abstention, in lieu of staying 
the proceedings).  Finding that the district court properly applied the Brillhart 
analysis, the Tenth Circuit in Las Cruces did not speak to whether the district court 
erred in dismissing the case under the Colorado River doctrine.  Id. at 1193.   
127 See, e.g., Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 554 (1876) (“[T]he pendency of a 
prior suit in another jurisdiction is not a bar . . . even though the two suits are for 
the same cause of action . . . .”); see also McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 
(1910) (stating that federal courts do not have the authority to abdicate jurisdiction 
due to pending state proceedings). 
128 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 869.  The Supreme Court has explained that 
whenever “a court has custody of property, that is, proceedings in rem or quasi in 
rem . . . the state or federal court having custody of such property has exclusive 
jurisdiction to proceed.”  Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964). 
129 An exception to the Anti-Injunction Act permits federal courts to enjoin state 
proceedings when property is involved.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).  A state court 
may also enjoin the initiation of federal litigation when there is an in rem or a quasi 
in rem proceeding in state court.  See Gen. Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 12 
(1977). 
130 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–19 
(1976); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 870. 
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to adjudicate, within its power, all of the claims effectively.131  In 
other words, a state court’s prior jurisdiction over a res creates 
an exceptional circumstance, as set forth in Colorado River, 
which allows a federal court to decline its jurisdiction.132 
In Colorado River, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, 
acknowledged the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction as one 
factor that a federal court may consider when deciding whether 
to dismiss an action.133  Although not explicitly applying the 
doctrine, Justice Brennan argued that the McCarran 
Amendment’s policy of avoiding piecemeal adjudication was 
similar to the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine’s objective to 
avoid additional litigation and inconsistent results.134 
Justice Stewart’s dissent pointed out that the doctrine of prior 
exclusive jurisdiction was inapplicable because the federal court 
did not need to obtain in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction.135  The 
United States was not asking for “control” of the river to 
ascertain federal reserved water rights.136  Accordingly, Justice 
Stewart argued that the Court only needed to determine as a 
matter of federal law whether the United States had specific 
rights in the flow of the water, and if such rights existed, the 
dates and scope of those rights.137  In the wake of this dissent, 
federal courts have nevertheless applied the doctrine of prior 
exclusive jurisdiction in the context of administering and 
adjudicating water rights.138 
 
131 Peter Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A Dissection of the Probate 
Exception to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1526–28 (2001). 
132 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983). 
133 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818. 
134 Id. at 819; see also Abrams, supra note 5, at 1123 (arguing that Justice 
Brennan, by joining these two considerations, “sought to overcome the 
Amendment’s silence about the proper forum”). 
135 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 822 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
136 Id. at 822–23. 
137 Id. 
138 See, e.g., State Eng’r of Nev. v. S. Fork Band of the Te-Moak Tribe of W. 
Shoshone Indians of Nev., 339 F.3d 804, 809–10 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d 1007, 1012–14 (9th Cir. 1999); Mineral 
County v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 806–07 (Nev. 2001). 
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V 
THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER WATER 
RIGHTS 
A. Fitting the Doctrines Together 
Colorado River created a presumption that a federal action 
should be dismissed when both federal and state actions are 
pending for purposes of adjudicating federal reserved water 
rights.  If a dispute arises out of a state’s comprehensive water 
rights administration, whether it involves federal, state, or tribal 
claims, a state court will usually preside over the case.  State 
courts generally have more expertise in deciding such matters, 
and state court jurisdiction tends to further the McCarran 
Amendment’s goal of avoiding piecemeal litigation.  However, if 
a party files a lawsuit seeking redetermination of court-decreed 
water rights, the court that made the first determination has 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear the second case.  The prior 
exclusive jurisdiction doctrine applies regardless of whether a 
state or federal court first heard the case.  Prior exclusive 
jurisdiction does not moot the issue of discretionary abstention 
in every case where a state water court first exercises 
jurisdiction.  The doctrine is triggered only if the state water 
court explicitly rules on a matter concerning real property in the 
first instance. 
The McCarran Amendment, which may apply to water 
decrees that were issued before the Amendment’s enactment in 
1952, does not repeal or supersede the prior exclusive 
jurisdiction doctrine.  However, debate lingers as to whether 
Colorado River, the McCarran Amendment, and subsequent 
case law have completely foreclosed federal courts from 
resolving disputes over water rights issues. 
Since Colorado River, the U.S. Supreme Court has confirmed 
that federal district courts have some discretion to abstain in 
favor of pending state court litigation.139  The Court has also 
 
139 See, e.g., Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286-87 (1995); Will v. Calvert 
Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 663–64 (1978).  There had been speculation, before 
Wilton was ruled on, that even discretion to deny declaratory relief in favor of 
concurrent state court litigation had been narrowed.  This speculation had been 
created by the Court’s ruling in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp. which found that Colorado River was a narrow exception to the  
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developed additional criteria for federal district courts to 
consider when deciding whether to defer to state court 
proceedings.  In addition to the four factors outlined in Colorado 
River,140 the Court added two more in Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital: (1) the determination of which forum’s substantive law 
governs the merits of the litigation; and (2) the adequacy of the 
state court proceeding to protect the parties’ rights.141  The Court 
emphasized that this was not a “mechanical checklist” and that a 
federal court must carefully balance all “important factors as 
they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in 
favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.”142 
In 1995, the Court in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. upheld a 
district court’s decision to stay a federal declaratory judgment 
action in favor of state proceedings.143  The Court held that the 
Brillhart discretionary standard, a broader doctrine, should 
govern the district court’s decision to stay a federal declaratory 
judgment.144  However, the Court did not reject the Colorado 
River exceptional circumstances test for certain instances.145  
Thus, absent a filing for a declaratory judgment, a federal court 
must still identify exceptional circumstances to determine 
whether to abstain on account of a pending state court 
proceeding.  Given Colorado River’s narrow abstention 
standard, a federal court’s jurisdiction over water rights issues 
 
normal obligation of federal district courts to decide cases before them.  460 U.S. 1, 
19, 25–26 (1983). 
140 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 15–16. 
141 Id. at 25–27. 
142 Id. at 16. 
143 Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290.  In Wilton, Seven Falls Co. was sued in Texas state 
court over the ownership and operation of several oil and gas properties.  Id. at 279.  
After it lost in state court, Seven Falls Co. sought indemnification from Wilton, an 
insurance underwriter.  Id. at 279–80.  Wilton sought a declaratory judgment in 
federal court for a ruling that it was not liable under the insurance policies.  Id.  In 
response, Seven Falls Co. filed a suit in state court against Wilton while also asking 
the federal court to dismiss or stay the state court proceeding.  Id. at 280.  The 
federal district court granted the stay, which was later affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court, to avoid duplicative litigation.  Id. at 280–82. 
144 Id. at 289–90. 
145 Id.; John J. Higson, Federal Court Jurisdiction over Interpleader Actions: A 
Virtual Unflagging Obligation or Inherently Discretional? The Third Circuit Opts for 
the Discretionary Approach, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1137, 1157 (1996).  The Court also 
relied on the discretionary nature of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act itself.  
Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286–87. 
 
2008] Watering Down Federal Court Jurisdiction 265 
may not be completely foreclosed by the Colorado River 
doctrine and the policies underlying the McCarran Amendment. 
B.  Administrative Procedure Act’s Revival of Federal 
Jurisdiction 
In 2004, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a state water 
court’s stay order to delay quantification of the United States’ 
reserved water right in the Black Canyon of Gunnison National 
Park was not an abuse of discretion.146  The court found that the 
water court acted within its discretion because the federal court 
had exclusive jurisdiction over federal claims raised by 
environmental groups.147 
The events leading up to the supreme court’s decision began 
over twenty-five years earlier.  On March 6, 1978, the United 
States was first awarded absolute and conditional waters for the 
Black Canyon area pursuant to an interlocutory decree issued by 
a Colorado state water court.148  This decree acknowledged 
priority dates of 1933, 1938, and 1939 to satisfy scenic, aesthetic, 
and natural purposes and uses of the reservation.149  In 2001, the 
United States filed an application to quantify its conditional 
water rights for the Black Canyon.150  More than 380 parties, 
including environmental groups, opposed this initial 
quantification application.151  Consequently, the water court 
stayed the action for over a year to allow the United States to 
enter into settlement negotiations.152  Following an agreement 
with the State of Colorado, the United States filed an amended 
quantification application to reduce its claim of water.153 
On August 5, 2003, environmental groups filed a complaint in 
federal district court regarding this amended application.154  The 
 
146 Application for Water Rights of the U.S. v. Colo. State Eng’r (In re 
Application for Water Rights of the U.S.), 101 P.3d 1072, 1074 (Colo. 2004) (en 
banc). 
147 Id. at 1084. 
148 Id. at 1075. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1076. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id.  
154 Id. 
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environmental groups alleged that the “United States’ decisions 
regarding the protection and management of the water-related 
natural resources of the Black Canyon violated various 
provisions of federal law.”155  These laws included the National 
Park Service Act, the Black Canyon Act, the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).156 
On September 12, 2003, the environmental groups filed a 
written motion to stay the water court’s quantification 
proceeding until the federal court resolved the issues before it.157  
To avoid piecemeal litigation and prevent undue hardship, 
delays, and prejudice to the environmental petitioners, the water 
court granted the stay on October 7, 2003.158  The water court’s 
order did not defer quantification of the water right, but merely 
stayed the proceedings until the federal court resolved the 
distinct federal questions raised in the complaint.159  The United 
States moved to dismiss the case from federal court but was 
denied.160  The court held federal agencies have a duty to protect 
national park resources, including the water that supports such 
uses and resources, pursuant to APA’s judicial review 
provisions.161  However, the court clearly stated that it was not 
determining the “exact amount of water necessary to fulfill the 




156 Id.  The environmental groups sought both declaratory relief and injunctive 
relief pursuant to the APA’s judicial review provision articulated in 5 U.S.C. § 706 
(2006).  Id. at 1076-77.  Specifically, they claimed that the United States violated the 
NPS Act and the Black Canyon Act because it did not protect the water-related 
natural resources in the subject area and “limited its reserved water right by relying 
upon an inadequate state-law in-stream flow right” without doing a NEPA 
environmental analysis.  Id. at 1077 n.1.  In addition, they claimed the United States 
violated federal law which prohibited an unauthorized dispossession of federal 
property by surrendering its federal reserved water right.  Id.  Finally, by giving the 
State of Colorado the responsibility to protect the federal park’s water rights, they 
claimed the United States unlawfully delegated authority.  Id.  







2008] Watering Down Federal Court Jurisdiction 267 
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that it did not have 
jurisdiction to examine the environmental groups’ federal claims 
under the McCarran Amendment.163  The Amendment limits the 
United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity to those 
proceedings that either determine or administer the rights to the 
use of water.164  According to the court, the dispute did not 
involve the use of water, but the Department of Interior and 
National Park Service’s compliance with APA provisions.165  
Citing the language and legislative history of the APA, the court 
noted that any decision made by a federal administrative agency 
could only be appealed and resolved by a federal court.166  
Therefore, the state court’s role in quantifying federal reserved 
water rights should be distinguished from the federal court’s 
responsibility in deciding whether the United States’ amended 
application complied with the applicable federal law.167 
The court next considered whether the water court’s decision 
to stay the proceedings constituted an abuse of discretion.  To 
make this determination, the supreme court evaluated factors 
that were similar to those outlined in Colorado River: “1) the 
order in which jurisdiction was obtained, 2) the adequacy of 
relief available in state court, 3) comity, and 4) the need for 
comprehensive adjudication and attendant desire to avoid 
piecemeal litigation.”168  The supreme court dismissed the first 
and fourth factors because the federal court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction over federal claims trumped both considerations.169  
In response to the second factor, the supreme court found that 
the water court’s stay protected the United States’ ability to 
 
163 Id. at 1078. 
164 Id. at 1079.  The McCarran Amendment provides, in relevant part, that 
“[c]onsent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the 
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source.” Id. at 
1080 (emphasis added) (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2006)). 
165 Id. 
166 Id.  A reviewing court shall “compel agency action unlawfully or 
unreasonably delayed” when a person suffers a “legal wrong because of agency 
action, or [is] adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning 
of a relevant statute.”  5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (2006).  That person who suffers the 
legal wrong is entitled to judicial review and may bring suit against the agency but 
only “in a court of the United States.”  5 U.S.C. § 702. 
167 Colorado State Eng’r, 101 P.3d at 1080. 
168 Id. at 1082–83. 
169 Id. at 1083–84. 
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claim broader reserved water rights in the future.170  Without the 
stay, res judicata might bar the United States from making such 
claims.171  With respect to the third factor, the supreme court 
noted the water court’s stay would promote comity by avoiding 
the potential for conflict between federal and state courts.172 
Although the supreme court explained that the federal court’s 
decision would not quantify the United States’ reserved water 
right,173 the differentiation underlying this conclusion is merely 
semantic.  The federal court’s determination of how much water 
is needed to fulfill the reservation’s broad range of uses will 
almost certainly impact the overall quantification of water rights, 
even if the decision does not provide a specific numeric 
allocation of water volume.  The state court itself acknowledged 
that the “federal case may have an impact on the water court 
proceeding”174 and “may influence the parameters of the water 
court’s decision.”175 
The dissent criticized the majority’s “neat distinction” 
between the federal court’s review of federal claims and the state 
court’s quantification of reserved water rights.176  According to 
the dissent, this differentiation did not fall in line with the 
interrelated factual and legal issues of the case and effectively 
abandoned the state’s role in McCarran adjudications.177  The 
dissent further stated that the federal court would be indirectly 
presiding over issues pertaining to the quantification and 
administration of federal reserved water rights, duties that are 
better suited for the water court pursuant to strong 
congressional policies expressed in the McCarran Amendment.178  
 
170 Id. at 1083. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 1083–84. 
174 Id. at 1080. 
175 Id. at 1084. 
176 Id. at 1088 (Hobbs, J., dissenting). 
177 Id.  
178 Id. at 1086.  The dissent disagreed that the federal court had exclusive 
jurisdiction over these claims just because these issues involved the authority of 
agency decision makers.  Id.  Instead, the dissent believed the water court had the 
authority under the McCarran Amendment, which states that the United States 
consents to being joined “for the administration of such rights,” to decide all factual 
and legal issues involved in the motion to amend and the administration agreement.  
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 666 (2006)).  In addition, by not integrating “federal rights  
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Despite the dissent’s persuasive logic, the decision still stands as 
an important case that federal decision makers may cite to argue 
for federal court jurisdiction based on the APA’s judicial review 
provisions. 
C.  Expanding Federal Court Jurisdiction over Water Rights 
In addition to using the APA exception, federal courts may be 
able to resolve water disputes before them by narrowly 
construing the application of the McCarran Amendment and the 
Colorado River decision.  The Amendment only applies to 
comprehensive stream adjudications, so it does not implicate 
every water rights controversy that involves the federal 
government.179  It is not entirely clear how comprehensive a 
water rights adjudication must be before a federal court should 
dismiss it.180 
States normally undergo a general stream adjudication to 
prioritize and quantify all rights to a water body.181  These 
adjudications enable states to administer all water rights 
“efficiently and effectively” and are especially helpful when 
federal reserved water rights are involved.182  Although most 
states in the West have utilized a state administrative agency to 
issue water permits as part of their general stream 
adjudication,183 considerable differences exist in the reach of each 
state’s adjudication.  Some states attempt to determine every 
right within its borders while others only concentrate on certain 
 
into the network of highly interdependent relative priorities for the use of water on 
common stream systems” the ultimate purpose of the McCarran Amendment is 
defeated.  Id. at 1087.  The federal court’s resolution of these federal claims is only a 
small “piece of a complex interrelated puzzle of the type Congress envisioned in 
adopting the McCarran Amendment for state court determination of rights to the 
use of water from the same stream system.”  Id. at 1089. 
179 Benson, supra note 41, at 273. 
180 Thomas H. Pacheco, How Big is Big? The Scope of Water Rights Suits Under 
the McCarran Amendment, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 627, 634–35 (1988).  The Court in 
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona warned state courts that they could 
lose their jurisdiction to determine federal water rights if their procedures did not 
rise to a full-fledged general stream adjudication.   Id. at 633–34. 
181 See id. at 635. 
182 Id  
183 In Colorado, water rights are qualified by making a claim and obtaining a 
decree from a water court.  See PETER D. NICHOLS ET AL., COLO. WATER TRUST, 
WATER RIGHTS HANDBOOK FOR COLORADO CONSERVATION PROFESSIONALS 
8–9 (2005). 
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categories of water interests.184  These differing approaches have 
practical implications as to how federal courts determine 
whether a state’s general stream adjudication is comprehensive 
enough to trigger the McCarran Amendment and the 
subsequent decision of whether to abstain.185 
For instance, in Dugan v. Rank, the Supreme Court held that 
the McCarran Amendment did not apply because: (1) the case 
involved a “private suit to determine water rights” solely 
between the plaintiff and the United States; (2) “all of the 
claimants to water rights along the river [were] not made 
parties” in the suit; (3) no relief was relief was requested as 
between claimants; and (4) the claimants did not seek priorities 
“as to the appropriate and prescriptive rights asserted.”186 
In Cappaert v. United States, the Court upheld a federal 
court’s injunction protecting water levels in an underground pool 
at  Devil’s Hole National Monument.187  The United States 
obtained the injunction against an irrigator with a water right 
permit issued under Nevada law,188 despite the State’s argument 
that the United States must claim its water rights in state court.189 
More recently, in United States v. Oregon, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected federal and tribal arguments against the sufficiency of 
Oregon’s Klamath Basin adjudication under the McCarran 
Amendment.190  The United States argued that the State’s 
proceedings were not sufficiently comprehensive for two 
reasons.  First, water rights determined in previous adjudications 
were not subject to redetermination; therefore, the United States 
could not challenge water rights certificates previously issued 
 
184 Pacheco, supra note 180, at 636.  Pacheco provides an overview of how 
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Oregon have developed their own 
statutory schemes for general stream adjudications.  Id. at 637–43. 
185 A number of questions arise when one attempts to determine whether a 
stream adjudication is general or comprehensive.  These inquiries focus on issues 
such as: how to define a “river system” for McCarran jurisdictional purposes; 
whether groundwater rights must be adjudicated; and whether every water user, 
including those with previously decreed water rights, must be joined.  Pacheco 
analyzes these issues “under the rubrics of hydrological comprehensiveness [and] 
water use comprehensiveness.”  Id. at 646–59. 
186 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618–19 (1963). 
187 Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 136–38 (1976). 
188 Id. at 134–37. 
189 Id. at 143–46. 
190 United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 762–63 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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through the permit system.191  Second, this adjudication did not 
attempt to determine the rights of claimants to groundwater in 
the Klamath Basin.192  The court dismissed the first argument by 
stating that a federal court could review any disputes regarding 
the volume or scope of particular reserved rights after the state 
court’s final judgment.193  The second argument failed because 
the court found that Congress probably did not intend the 
Amendment to apply to the rights of users of all hydrologically 
related water sources, such as groundwater.194 
The Colorado River Court acknowledged another set of 
circumstances where a federal court may be able to exercise its 
concurrent jurisdiction with the state court and proceed with the 
case: 
We emphasize, however, that we do not overlook the heavy 
obligation [of federal courts] to exercise jurisdiction.  We need 
not decide, for example, whether, despite the McCarran 
Amendment, dismissal would be warranted if more extensive 
proceedings had occurred in the District Court prior to 
dismissal, if the involvement of state water rights were less 
extensive then it is here, or if the state proceeding were in 
some respect inadequate to resolve the federal claims.195 
In light of this language, courts have decided that some 
situations make determinations of federal reserved water rights 
better suited for federal court.  The Colorado Supreme Court’s 
APA carve-out (described in Section B above) is one such 
example.  The Adair II court set forth another.  In that case, the 
court noted that it did not make sense for the federal court to 
dismiss the case when it would only be deciding limited federal 
questions, and state proceedings had not yet advanced beyond 
the initial notice of investigation.196  The court concluded that 
dismissing the case under the circumstances would waste judicial 
 
191 Id. at 767–68. 
192 Id. at 768. 
193 Id. (citing United States v. Dist. Court in & for Water Div. No. 05, 401 U.S. 
527, 527 (1971)). 
194 Id. at 769. 
195 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 820 
(1976). 
196 United States v. Adair (Adair II), 723 F.2d 1394, 1404–05 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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resources and contravene the policies underlying the McCarran 
Amendment.197 
Another situation in which the administration and 
determination of water rights may be adjudicated in federal 
court is when such rights have been previously determined in 
federal court pursuant to a water decree.  For instance, the 
federal courts in United States v. Alpine Land and Reservoir Co. 
and Mineral County v. State both exercised jurisdiction pursuant 
to the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine.198  In these cases, the 
federal court had already ruled on actions concerning the 
relevant water rights and thus had exclusive jurisdiction over the 
matter.  Further, the Alpine Land court’s decision was important 
for the federal court to provide a consistent and controlling 
interpretation of federal law since the water decree involved the 
allocation of interstate waters between California and Nevada.  
The Colorado River Court cited the prior exclusive doctrine as a 
factor and an exceptional circumstance that a court should take 
into account when determining whether a federal court should 
exercise its jurisdiction.199  Overall, circumstances do exist when 
federal courts may proceed to resolve a water rights dispute 




Federal courts in general do not abstain when there is 
identical concurrent litigation in state court.  Even though 
concurrent jurisdiction is economically wasteful and induces 
parties to attempt to “manipulate the timing of the decisions” to 
satisfy their needs, the judiciary is reluctant to give litigants the 
power to avoid federal court by filing in state court.200  However, 
by examining the underlying policies of the McCarran 
Amendment as well as other factors, the Colorado River Court 
ruled that federal water rights should be resolved in state court 
 
197 Id. at 1405–06. 
198 See supra note 138. 
199 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818. 
200 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 879–80. 
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proceedings for purposes of preventing duplicative litigation.201  
Therefore, Colorado River provided some guidance in 
determining that state courts should hear cases involving federal 
water rights. 
Some commentators, including Professor Robert H. Abrams, 
believed that Colorado River would create strong incentives for 
state courts to discriminate against federal reserved water 
rights.202  However, in the years following Colorado River, 
federal courts have exercised their jurisdiction when distinct 
federal questions and claims were involved, federal proceedings 
were more mature than concurrent state proceedings, or an 
alternative federal statutory provision mandated federal judicial 
review.203  Thus, federal courts may still have some leeway in 
deciding to exercise their jurisdiction, even in the face of a 
pending state court proceeding.204  Although these distinctions 
may appease decision makers asserting federal reserved water 
rights, these exceptions also create confusion over jurisdictional 
issues that existed prior to the passage of the McCarran 
Amendment and the Colorado River decision. 
Regardless of whether federal or state courts are better suited 
to hearing such cases, additional congressional guidance as to 
when federal courts should abstain because of ongoing state 
proceedings might be the best solution to the problem of 
 
201 Id at 873.  See generally Howard A. Davis, Slowing the Flow of Colorado 
River: The Doctrine of Abstention to Promote Judicial Administration, 77 ILL. B.J. 
648 (1989) (discussing how the Colorado River factors should be applied by courts). 
In addition, when federal courts rule on cases involving declaratory judgments, the 
Declaratory Judgment Act provides federal courts with more discretion in 
abstaining regardless of whether they find exceptional circumstances or not.  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 880. 
202 Abrams, supra note 5, at 1111. 
203 See supra Part V. 
204 It must be noted that even if a federal court decides not to exercise its 
jurisdiction for general stream adjudications, the state court that does have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate federal and tribal water right claims must still apply 
federal law.  See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145–46 (1976); 
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983).  The Court 
in San Carlos Apache Tribe emphasized that if a state court misapplied federal law 
or seriously abridged a tribal interest, that decision might be reviewed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court subject to “a particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate 
with the powerful federal interest in safeguarding those rights from state 
encroachment.”  Id. at 571. 
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duplicative proceedings.205  For instance, Congress could create a 
rule that mirrors the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine and 
allows the court that first acquired jurisdiction to decide the case 
and enjoin the parties from proceeding in the other court.206  The 
downside of such a rule is that it could induce parties to “race to 
the courthouse” to ensure that the case is heard in a forum that 
best satisfies their agenda.207  Until Congress devises some 
solution to the problem of duplicative litigation, “pending 
concurrent proceedings in state and federal court undoubtedly 
will continue to be a frequent problem confronting the judicial 
system.”208 
In addition, as water scarcity increases in the West, federal 
courts will become increasingly burdened with water rights 
disputes.  Although federal courts will most likely preside over 
interstate water rights conflicts,209 intrastate conflicts may be 
decided either in federal or state court, depending on the 
comprehensiveness of adjudications and the types of water rights 
involved.  Until Congress sets forth more concrete and specific 
guidelines assigning jurisdiction, federal courts must continue to 
examine whether “exceptional circumstances” exist that should 
prevent them from exercising jurisdiction. 
 
 
205 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 885. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 886. 
209 The Supreme Court may allocate interstate waters pursuant to the 
Constitution’s grant of original jurisdiction over conflicts between states.  U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 83–84 (1907). 
